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ABSTRACT
Although essential to revealing biased performance, well inten-
tioned attempts at algorithmic auditing can have effects that may
harm the very populations these measures are meant to protect.
This concern is even more salient while auditing biometric sys-
tems such as facial recognition, where the data is sensitive and
the technology is often used in ethically questionable manners.
We demonstrate a set of five ethical concerns in the particular case
of auditing commercial facial processing technology, highlighting
additional design considerations and ethical tensions the auditor
needs to be aware of so as not exacerbate or complement the harms
propagated by the audited system. We go further to provide tangi-
ble illustrations of these concerns, and conclude by reflecting on
what these concerns mean for the role of the algorithmic audit and
the fundamental product limitations they reveal.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Facial processing technology (FPT) is a broad term that encompasses
a variety of tasks ranging from face detection, which involves locat-
ing a face within a bounding box in an image; facial analysis, which
determines an individual’s facial characteristics including physical
or demographic traits; and face verification or identification, which
is the task of differentiating a single face from others.
FPT can be deployed for a wide range of uses ranging from
smiling detection to gauge customer satisfaction, to estimating the
demographic characteristics of a subject population, to tracking in-
dividuals using face identification tools [37]. Corporate rhetoric on
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the positive uses of this technology includes claims of “understand-
ing users”, “monitoring or detecting human activity”, “indexing and
searching digital image libraries”, and verifying and identifying
subjects “in security scenarios” [1, 8, 16, 33].
The reality of FPT deployments, however, reveals that many
of these uses are quite vulnerable to abuse, especially when used
for surveillance and coupled with predatory data collection prac-
tices that, intentionally or unintentionally, discriminate against
marginalized groups [2]. The stakes are particularly high when
we consider companies like Amazon and HireVue, who are selling
their services to police departments or using the technology to help
inform hiring decisions respectively [5, 43].
Civil rights organizations have already sounded the alarm against
facial recognition technology in particular and the need for urgent
policy and regulatory action to restrict its use. Several states in the
United States–California, Washington, Idaho, Texas, and Illinois–in
addition to some cities–San Francisco, Oakland, and Somerville–are
already taking the lead in regulating or outright banning the use
of these technologies through coordinated campaigns such as the
ACLU’s Community Control Over Police Surveillance (CCOPS) ini-
tiative. As of the writing of this paper, federal bill proposals such as
the Algorithmic Accountability Act [9], Commercial Facial Recog-
nition Privacy Act of 2019 [4] and No Biometric Barriers Act [10]
have also been proposed in the U.S., as well as a bill proposing a
moratorium in the U.K. [11].
Several of these proposals and their corresponding memos ex-
plicitly recommend that the results of FPT audits such as Gender
Shades [6] and benchmarks developed through the National Insti-
tute of Standards and Technology [38] serve as conditions for FPT
accreditation or moratorium. The language used in these proposals
frames such audits as trusted mechanisms to certify the technology
as safe and reliable for deployment.
In this paper, we caution against this stance, outlining ethical
concerns we have identified in the development and use of these
algorithmic audits. We believe these concerns to be inherent restric-
tions to the utility of these audits within the broader evaluation of
these systems, and propose to explicitly acknowledge these limita-
tions as we make use of the audits in practice and in policy.
Our primary contributions are as follows. We first develop Celeb-
SET, a new intersectional FPT benchmark dataset consisting of
celebrity images, and evaluate a suite of commercially available
FPT APIs using this benchmark. We then use our benchmark and
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audit development process as a case study, and outline a set of
ethical considerations and ethical tensions relevant to algorithmic
auditing practices.
2 CELEBSET: A TYPICAL FPT BENCHMARK
Datasets such as Face Recognition Vendor Tests (FRVT), IARPA
Janus Benchmarks (IJB) [38], and the Pilot Parliaments Benchmark
(PPB) [6] have been key to identifying classification bias in the
specific tasks of face detection, verification, identification, identity
clustering and gender recognition. Audits conducted using these
datasets have heavily informed many of the recent attempts to
address the dearth of diversity in FPT benchmarks and proposed
frameworks for evaluating classification bias in deployed systems
[32, 43, 45]. Although these prior studies evaluate commercially
deployed models for gender and racial discrimination in FPT, there
are few benchmarks that enable the evaluation of the full range
of classification tasks commercially available in facial processing
technology today, and none that enables an intersectional black
box audit evaluation for such a wide range of tasks.
To address this gap, we develop a benchmark called CelebSET,
a subset of the IMDB-WIKI dataset [40] that includes 80 celebrity
identities–20 of the most photographed celebrities from each of the
subgroups ‘darkermale’(DM), ‘darker female’(DF), ‘lightermale’(LM)
and ‘lighter female’(LF). Metadata pertaining to celebrity ethnicity
were crawled from the celebrity fan websites FamousFix.com and
ethiccelebs.com, and indexed to celebrity identities from the IMDB-
WIKI dataset.‘Darker’(D) is approximated by taking a subset of the
images of celebrities tagged with the crawled ‘Black’ label from our
crawled dataset, and selecting subjects within the 3 to 6 range of
the Fitzpatrick skin type scale [41] using the reported Fitzpatrick
labels of celebrity references for guidance. The ‘Lighter’(L) individ-
uals are a subset of subjects with the crawled ‘White’ label, also
verified through visual inspection to approximate the skin type of
celebrity references for a Fitzpatrick scale of 1 to 3. Gender - de-
fined as ‘Male’(M) and ‘Female’(F) - as well as age metadata is taken
from the IMDB-WIKI dataset. We estimate the age of the celebrity
depicted in each photo by subtracting the person’s known date
of birth from the timestamp of the uploaded photo. We manually
identify 10 smiling and 10 non-smiling example images for each
celebrity.
We use the original uncropped images with bounding box labels
provided from the IMDB-WIKI dataset [40] to perform our audit on
the detection task and use cropped face images from the original
dataset to audit facial analysis tasks. The full dataset with meta-
data, cropped and uncropped images is available as Supplementary
Materials.
2.1 API Evaluation on CelebSET
We evaluate the APIs of Microsoft, Amazon, and Clarifai, which
offer the widest scope of facial analysis tasks. Microsoft is notable
as a target corporation in the initial Gender Shades study [6], and
Amazon in the follow up study, Actionable Auditing [39]. Clarifai
is notable as an API that has not been previously included in any
prior audit studies. For tasks such as automatic gender recognition,
smile detection, and name identification, we evaluate the accuracy
Table 1: Overall accuracy on designated facial analysis pre-
diction tasks.
Gender Age Name Smile Detection
Microsoft 99.94% 74.09% 98.69% 79.94% 93.56%
Amazon 99.75% 58.40% 87.25% 94.16% 99.25%
Clarifai 85.97% 55.24% 95.00% 56.19% 99.31%
Table 2: Difference in accuracy between the lighter (L) sub-
group and darker (D) subgroup for each prediction task.
Task Gender Age Name Smile Detection
Microsoft 0.13% 18.35% 1.41% -0.48% 3.38%
Amazon 0.25% 16.83% 1.03% -0.75% 0.25%
Clarifai 11.69% 1.00% 7.50% 0.12% 0.42%
Table 3: Difference in accuracy between the Male (M) sub-
group and female (F) subgroup for each prediction task.
Task Gender Age Name Smile Detection
Microsoft 0.13% 9.90% 1.23% -4.45% 0.62%
Amazon 0.00% 12.28% 4.75% -9.00% 0.50%
Clarifai 7.58% 10.26% -1.01% 1.25% -1.63%
of the predicted value as compared to ground truth. For age predic-
tion, we allow for an 8-year acceptance margin to accommodate
the age range results of the Amazon API. We evaluate detection
performance using the AP50, the average precision at a threshold
of 0.50 intersection over union (IoU). All evaluation results are as
of October 2019. Calculation details, code and complete results of
the audit are included in Supplementary Materials.
2.1.1 Overall Performance. As shown in Table 1, all APIs perform
best on the task of gender classification–with the exception of
Clarifai which performs best on face detection. It is noteworthy
that two of the target APIs, Amazon and Microsoft, have been
publicly audited for gender classification in previous studies, and
have since released newAPI versions in response to the audits citing
improvements [6, 39]. All APIs perform worst on age classification,
with Amazon and Clarifai performing slightly better than chance
on this task.
2.1.2 Performance on Unitary Subgroups. Tables 2–3 show that
with few exceptions, all APIs perform worst on the darker sub-
group and female subgroup across tasks, a finding supported by
previous work [6]. Clarifai, the only commercial API which was
not previously publicly audited for the task of gender classification,
demonstrated notably higher disparities across unitary groups for
that task compared to the competing APIs.
2.1.3 Performance on Intersectional Subgroups. Table 4 lists in-
tersectional subgroup performance and shows patterns found in
previous work: that the most common “least accurate subgroup” is
the darker female subgroup and the most common “most accurate
subgroup” is the lighter male subgroup, though there are varied
configurations with exceptions to this trend.
Table 4: Difference in accuracy between the best and worst performing intersectional subgroups by prediction task. The sub-
groups are darker females (DF), darker males (DM), lighter females (LF) and lighter males (LM). Values in bold denote equal
performance. For instance, 0.25% (DM/LM/LF - DF) signifies that the difference in accuracy between DM and DF, i.e. DM-DF,
LM-DF and LF-DF are all 0.25%.
Gender Age Name Smile Detection(AP50)
Microsoft 0.25% (DM/LM/LF - DF) 29.47% (LF-DF) 3.90% (LF-DF) 8.02% (LF-LM) 4.25% (LM-DM)
Amazon 0.50% (LF-DF) 29.10%(LM-DF) 6.71% (DM-DF) 9.75% (DF-LM) 0.75% (LM-DF/LF)
Clarifai 19.10% (LM-DF) 11.21% (LM-DF) 10.50% (LM-DF) 3.00% (LF-LM) 0.50% (LM/LF-DF)
3 ACKNOWLEDGING ANDWORKING
THROUGH AUDIT ETHICAL CONCERNS
Using our audit conducted with CelebSET as an example, we walk
through ethical concerns in current algorithmic auditing practices.
We separate these concerns into design considerations and tensions.
While ethical design considerations outline additional points to be
noted during the audit design in order for the audit to truthfully
represent the performance of the system, ethical tensions, represent
situations where different ethical ideals come into conflict and hard
decisions need to be made regarding an appropriate path forward.
3.1 Design Considerations
3.1.1 Consideration 1: Selecting Scope of Impact. Algorithmic au-
dits can target a specific demographic group, prediction task, or
company. This narrow scope of targets can facilitate greater impact,
focusing efforts of improvement on addressing the highest risk
threats. However, doing so also significantly limits the scope of the
audit’s impact, and allow institutions to overfit improvements to
the specified tasks.
The practical reliability of the results of a benchmark also de-
pends on the contextual and temporal relevance of the data used in
evaluations to the audit use case. If it is not communicated when it
is appropriate to use a benchmark, then there is no indication of
when it becomes an obsolete measure of performance. This also
applies for aligning the context of use of the audited system and the
audit - if one demographic is under-represented in a benchmark,
then it should not be used to evaluate a modelâĂŹs performance
on a population within that demographic. Even with intersectional
considerations, there is a limit to the scope of which categories are
included.
Illustration The audits conducted through CelebSET reveal that
these types of external audits can only be used as an accountability
mechanism within a narrow scope of influence. For instance, Clari-
fai has a 19.10% discrepancy between its best performing subgroup
(lighter male) and worst performing subgroup (darker female) for
the gender classification task, mirroring results from the original
audits of the Gender Shades study [6] and demonstrating a much
greater disparity compared to the difference in error rates for Mi-
crosoft and Amazon (0.25% and 0.50% respectively). In fact, both
Amazon and Microsoft have their lowest intersectional discrepan-
cies in gender classification, a task they have been both publicly
audited for, and for which both companies released updated APIs
after the disclosure of audit results. This replicates findings from
the Actionable Auditing study–those that have been previously
audited have smaller disparities on CelebSET, compared to those
that have not been previously auditied, and thus classification bias
continues to be a persistent challenge within the industry [39].
We found that this result holds not only for the audited company
but also the task itself. In our CelebSET audit, we observed the
largest difference in accuracy for Microsoft and Amazon is for the
age classification task (a 29.47% and 29.10% discrepancy respectively
between the error rates for the best performing (lighter female, and
lighter male, respectively) and worst performing (darker female)
subgroups). Although these companies have smaller disparities in
error rates for the task of binary gender classification in response
to being audited, large performance disparities are identified for
other tasks. This may imply that external algorithmic audits only
incentivize companies to address performance disparities on the
tasks they are publicly audited for.
Also, institutions strive to reduce performance disparities across
subgroups that have been the focus of prior public audits (e.g. binary
gender and skin type). Since many of the audited APIs are currently
proposed for use by U.S. law enforcement [7], immigration [18],
and military services [30], the focus on performance across skin
types may make sense in order to assess the risk to people of color
who are over-policed and subject to additional profiling in these
scenarios. However, there are other marginalized groups or cases
to consider who may be being ignored. For instance, dysfunction in
facial analysis systems locked out transgender Uber drivers from be-
ing able to access their accounts to begin work [31]. These and other
issues have sparked recent work to start addressing performance
disparities for this specific group [42].
While it is important to strive for equal performance across
subgroups in some tasks, audits have to be deliberate so as not to
normalize tasks that are inherently harmful to certain communities.
The gender classification task on which previously audited cor-
porations minimized classification bias, for example, has harmful
effects in both incorrect and correct classification. For example,
it can promote gender stereotypes [19], is exclusionary of trans-
gender, non-binary, and gender non-conforming individuals, and
threatens further harm against already marginalized individuals
[22]. Thus, minimizing performance disparities and investing in the
improvement of that task specifically may not be the most ethical
focus of impact.
3.1.2 Consideration 2: Auditing for Procedural Fairness. Auditing
outcomes is not enough. To adequately evaluate FPTs as systems
embedded in their deployed environments, we need to consider
the audit as more than the final system’s performance on a single
benchmark. It has been well established in tax compliance that
taking a procedural fairness approach to organizational audits leads
to more effective evaluations. For example, studies in Australia and
Malaysia sought to dissuade companies from looking for loopholes
or averting tax payment–a corporate malpractice that costs states
billions of dollars each year. Instead of simply looking at whatever
financial documents were submitted, auditors instead evaluated
the company’s adherence to a tax compliance process [17, 36],
by auditing the companies’ internal practices and documentation
development processes. The result was that institutions audited
in this manner subsequently became more compliant (i.e., paid
more of their taxes), and felt less intimidated by auditors. Similar
findings have been discovered in employment peer review [14]
and computer information security [15], revealing that inspecting
adherence to a fixed and defined process for compliance standards
is just as important as the result of the compliance audit itself.
Similarly, performance disparities surfaced by FPT audits do not
necessarily capture the dynamics or integrity of the engineering
design processes that led to these results. In some cases, “proce-
dural fairness” for machine learning (ML) systems involves inter-
pretability methods that attempt to understand how a prediction
is made. In the case of automated facial analysis tasks, an example
is identifying image features that are most likely to influence the
output, and ensuring that these features do not encode protected
attributes such as race. However, such a perspective constitutes a
fairly constrained view as an FPT’s effect on people is not limited
to its prediction. The manner in which the technology is developed
(e.g. were there predatory data collection practices?), the types of
tests that are performed, the documentation made available, and
the guardrails that are put in place are all important considera-
tions. FPT evaluations such as the Face Recognition Vendor Test
(FRVT) from the National Institute of Standards and Technology
include some version of these qualitative considerations, such as a
holistic product usability test [38]. But there remains a need for a
comprehensive auditing framework which takes into account the
end-to-end product development and deployment process.
Illustration To demonstrate the biases baked into the model
development and design process not captured by the CelebSET
audit, we examine the diversity of the selected celebrity identities
included in the APIs’ model design for this task. Each of the audited
APIs has a model that takes as its input an image, and outputs the
name of the celebrity contained in the image. We can analyze the
demographic distribution of the celebrities included in each API,
in order to understand who product developers consider to be a
celebrity, and how representative this selection is.
We estimate the full list of celebrity names used in the Microsoft
classifier through a publicly released dataset from the company
which includes 100,000 logged celebrity identities [21]. Clarifai gives
users access to the full list of 10,000 celebrities through its API, and
Amazon does not make the list of included celebrity identities avail-
able in any form. We obtain each celebrity’s race by matching their
identity to ethnicity labels on FamousFix.com and ethniccelebs.com.
Table 5 shows the breakdown of ethnicities that are represented in
Microsoft’s and Clarifai’s databases. While Clarifai includes many
more Caucasian celebrity identities (74% of celebrity labels) than
any other group, Microsoft, with 37% Caucasian, 19% Asian and 21%
Black celebrity names included appears to have a more inclusive
design.
Had we focused solely on the performance of these APIs on
CelebSET, we would have missed this label selection bias and re-
mained with an incomplete understanding of the design flaws that
influence the APIs’ performance. While comprehensive auditing
frameworks examining model development and deployment pro-
cesses are yet to be developed, documentation proposals such as
datasheets [20], model cards [34] and factsheets [24] can encour-
age designers to carefully think about these processes if they are
required elements of such an audit.
3.2 Ethical Tensions
3.2.1 Tension 1: Privacy and Representation. While audit bench-
mark datasets should reflect the populations who will be impacted
by the audited technology, collecting a sufficiently large and diverse
dataset can present privacy risks for the individuals represented
in the dataset. Depending on data storage and dissemination poli-
cies, sensitive and biometric information may be made accessible
beyond the intended auditing purpose. These risks can be further
compounded by potential consent violations during the data col-
lection process. For example, IBM’s Diversity in Faces dataset was
sourced from Creative Common licensed images uploaded to Flickr
[32]. While these images are open for public internet use, the Flickr
users who uploaded the photos, and the individuals in the photos,
did not consent to being included in a facial recognition dataset
[44].
Privacy and consent violations in the dataset curation process
often disproportionately affect members of marginalized communi-
ties. Benchmark dataset curation frequently involves supplement-
ing or highlighting data from a specific population that is under-
represented in previous datasets. Efforts to increase representation
of this group can lead to tokenism and exploitation, compromise
privacy, and perpetuate marginalization through population moni-
toring and targeted violence [22, 25, 35]. And the method through
which companies pursue better representation can be ethically ques-
tionable. For instance, a startup signed a deal with the Zimbabwe
government to harvest the faces of millions of citizens through
unprecedented access to their CCTV cameras, smart financial sys-
tems, airport, railway, and bus station security, and a national facial
database [23]. Without seeking the active consent of impacted in-
dividuals and working towards mutual benefit, such an act can
be exploitative and tokenizing of the humans contributing to the
improvement of the system for which their data is used.
Illustration CelebSET was sourced from IMDB-WIKI [40], a
dataset with significant demographic bias that can be seen in the
distribution of meta-data labels in Table 6 and Table 7. Certain
groups are not only highly underrepresented, but there are fewer
images per person from these groups. This skew is a result of media
and social biases that make certain subgroups less photographed
than others, and thus less likely to exist in CelebSET’s source data.
This lack of representation becomes even more stark when consid-
ering intersectional identities such as Black women.
Consequently, when aiming to design a “demographically bal-
anced” benchmark, i.e., one with equal representation from the
designated demographic subgroups, it is more challenging to suf-
ficiently represent certain groups relative to others. Thus, by ac-
tively seeking to include members of underrepresented groups, the
Table 5: Breakdown of celebrity identities in commercial APIs by ethnicity.
Asian White Hispanic Black Middle Eastern Indian Other/Mixed Total
Microsoft API 7,838 15,536 10 8,816 995 1,316 7,167 41,678
18.8% 37.3% 0.02% 21.1% 2.4% 3.2% 17.2% 100.0%
Clarifai API 172 4,861 0 534 31 125 800 6,523
2.6% 74.5% 0.0% 8.2% 0.5% 1.9% 12.3% 100.0%
Table 6: Breakdown of IMDB-WIKI data examples by ethnicity.
Asian White Hispanic Black Middle Eastern Indian Other/Mixed Total
IMDB-WIKI-Eth 7,557 338,896 351 29,613 1,160 3,299 33,468 414,344
1.8% 81.8% 0.1% 7.2% 0.3% 0.8% 8.1% 100.0%
Table 7: Breakdownof IMDB-WIKI data examples by gender.
Male Female Unknown Total
IMDB-WIKI 230,912 179,900 3,532 414,344
55.7% 43.4% 0.85% 100%
privacy risk is disproportionately increased for that group. For in-
stance, in this case, there is twice the likelihood that an image from
the “Black” subgroup of the reference dataset will be included in
CelebSET than an image from the “White” subgroup.
In addition to the ethical challenges emerging from the skewed
distribution of the data source, we also encounter challenges per-
taining to obtaining consent. The CelebSET dataset is sourced from
a database of public figures. While these individuals have, from a
legal perspective, opted in to having their likeness used freely in
the public domain, we acknowledge that they have not consented
to inclusion in an FPT benchmarking dataset specifically. While
an opt-in informed consent process would be ideal for subjects
included in the benchmark, the individuals in CelebSET are effec-
tively unreachable and thus cannot be contacted to give informed
opt-in consent. Even the less ideal opt-out model is challenging to
implement as many subjects may never become aware that their
face is in the dataset, thus rendering the option to opt-out meaning-
less. The consistency of the benchmark can also be compromised if
the dataset changes over time through the removal of individuals.
3.2.2 Tension 2: Intersectionality and Group-Based Fairness. The
concept of intersectionality, coined by legal scholar Crenshaw [12],
is a framework for understanding how interlocking systems of
power and oppression give rise to qualitatively different experiences
for individuals holding multiply marginalized identities [13].
Crenshaw writes of moving beyond stereotypical assignments
and recognizing decision outcomes on a more individualized basis
– observing an individual to be at the intersection of numerous
unique combinations of identities, possessing several dimensions of
privilege and oppression. However, in order for group fairness to be
evaluated, an individual’s experience must be reduced to a categor-
ical assignment, even while performing disaggregated analysis to
account for multiple categories. Although inspired by intersection-
ality, this type of multi-axis disaggregated analysis fails to capture
Figure 1: Histogram of the age distribution in CelebSET. The
median age is 37, the mode is 36 and the mean is 37.56. The
youngest subject is 14 and the oldest is 77. Blue signifies over-
all age distribution. Purple, orange, green and red show the
age distribution for darker males, lighter males, darker fe-
males and lighter females respectively.
how systems of power and oppression give rise to qualitatively
different experiences for individuals holding multiply marginalized
identities [25].
Illustration While developing our CelebSET benchmark, we
paid careful attention to balance it with respect to a crawled “eth-
nicity” label and binary gender. Although such a design is derived
from the naturally occurring labels of the crawled and referenced
datasets, the selected groupings have inherent limitations. Unlike
the Pilot Parliaments Benchmark from the Gender Shades study
[6] where the intersectional groups are defined with respect to
skin type, “ethnicity” is an attribute that is highly correlated but
not deterministically linked to racial categories, which are them-
selves nebulous social constructs, encompassing individuals with
a wide range of phenotypic features [3]. Similarly, binary gender
labels are compatible with the format of commercial product out-
puts, but exclusionary of those not presenting in the stereotypical
representations of each selected gender identity [29].
We can see in Figure 1 that although CelebSET is balanced with
respect to gender and coarse ethnicity labels, it is highly unbalanced
with respect to age. At times, the exclusion of a particular group
is unavoidable - for instance, our dataset lacks children because of
the legal restrictions around the online exposure of a child. The
average age of darker females in our benchmark is 37, with lighter
males at 39, lighter females at 32, and darker males at 41. Since there
are many more younger lighter females than older darker males,
it is unclear whether the disparities between those groups is more
correlated with age rather than race or gender. It is thus possible
to optimize performance across gender and ethnicity categories in
our benchmark, while continuing to perform poorly with respect
to age (i.e. improve accuracy for only older darker males). This is
an observation of the fairness gerrymandering effect [28] - where
optimizing for fairness on one axis can compromise fairness in
another.
3.2.3 Tension 3: Transparency and Overexposure. To limit misin-
terpretations of evaluation results on specific benchmarks, it is
important to clearly communicate the limit of each benchmark
and its appropriate context of use. Sharing details of the dataset
development process with auditors and targets helps clarify the
limit of the audit’s scope, and the context in which results should
be interpreted and appropriately acted upon. Similarly, publicly
disclosing named audit targets can incite pressure to make the audit
itself more impactful [39]. However, all this may come at great cost
- such communications can also lead to targets overfitting to opti-
mize product performance on the audit. Audits of this nature have
also made institutions wary – in September 2019, IBM, an audit
target in the Gender Shades study, removed its facial recognition
capabilities from its publicly distributed API [26]. Similarly, Kairos
began putting its services behind an expensive paywall following
its inclusion in the Actionable Auditing study [27]. Such practices,
although rightfully stopping developers from using a product re-
vealed to be flawed, also compromise the product’s auditability –
making it more expensive and challenging for auditors to evaluate,
even though it may still be in active use by enterprise customers.
Illustration In order to communicate the biases and limitations
of CelebSET, we can create a datasheet [20] which helps clarify the
context in which the benchmark should be used. This datasheet
can specify, for instance, which demographic groups are covered in
the audit, and what types of product applications the benchmark
is best suited for. We can additionally note the small scope and
limited demographic groupings of this particular audit. However,
IMDB-Wiki, from which CelebSET and its variants are derived,
is a publicly available online dataset [40]. This means the entire
process of benchmark development is easily accessible to anyone
including an audit target, who may decide to include the images in
their training set. It is thus inevitable that the dataset will become
obsolete as products overfit on the data.
4 RECONSIDERING THE ROLE OF
ALGORITHMIC AUDITS
Our work shows that the algorithmic audit itself is a testing ground
for the ethical concerns it is meant to evaluate. The audits need to
be done with careful attention to the traps their targets fall into,
and auditors must strive to live up to the ethical ideals they expect
from their targets.
Auditors, thus, should approach these evaluations with a certain
level of humility, acknowledging the limitations of their own evalua-
tions and contextualizing each benchmark result as one component
of a larger and more qualitative audit framework, which should
begin by questioning the ethical use case of the product itself. The
humble goal of the algorithmic audit is thus to expose blind spots
rather than validate performance. Given its very own limitations
and ethical concerns, FPT audits on benchmarks like CelebSET are
a necessary but insufficient condition. They are inspections that
can be used to stall or halt deployment, but do not have the weight
of meaning to, by themselves, be used to justify FPT deployment
or act as a condition for a moratorium. This means CelebSET as a
benchmark should not be considered as a reward to game or a goal
to strive for, but a very low bar not to be caught tripping over.
5 CONCLUSION
While designing CelebSET, an audit process for products employing
facial processing technology (FPT), we were able to identify several
ethical concerns with the developing norms of the algorithmic
auditing of such products. These concerns in audit outcomes and
processes often intersect with those of the audited product itself, as
an unethical audit process can lead to a false sense of progress on
the alignment of facial processing technology with the principles
we have put forth. Both the audit process and the audited FPT, for
instance, need to have careful privacy considerations, and avoid
exploiting marginalized groups in the blind pursuit of increasing
representation. If we take seriously the ethical expectations we
have for the audited product, then we must also apply that same
standard to the data and processes defining our evaluation.
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